This research focuses on the organisational structure of risk management in companies. Particular emphasis is placed on the concept of Integrated Risk Management (IRM), a concept that advocates – in the literature and and in practice – that individual risk is not the relevant benchmark for a company’s risk management decisions but rather the effect that this individual risk will have on the company’s overall risk profile. Consequently, decisions about how individual risks are to be handled must always be made within the context of the whole company and such decisions must be coordinated.
This research focuses on regulation issues in the banking and insurance sector. Several of these have been studied, and particular consideration has been given to the incentive systems available to the respective stakeholders. The development of financial instruments for the incentive-based granting of loans and the “mis-selling” of insurance products are priority issues.
Managers manage companies on behalf of the owners, usually without holding any significant share in the company. Bearing in mind that managers are explicitly required to make decisions and to have their own ideas about the company’s development, this produces quite a specific dynamic. In this aspect of the research, the focus is on analysing the (financial) basis on which decisions are made and how these affect corporate performance.